Although harmonization of EC banking laws has only Just started, it does already have some pracUcal significance, because in adjustments of national laws account is taken to some extent of the Ideas developed on the level of the Community. Nevertheless, a number of problems make it doubtful that a meaningful harmonization in that field can be realized in the near future.
S
ince 1971, the harmonization of banking legislation has been on the agenda of the European Commission in Brussels. The first limited and unofficial proposal for a directive appeared in that year, serving as a basis for an exchange of views. Comments came in from various sides. The result was a new -still informal -draft directive, which appeared by mid-1972. This was a proper directive, though it was limited to the supervision of the way banks conduct their affairs and did not present a monetary policy aiming at the control of liquidity supply. At the time the idea was to harmonize banking legislation as far as possible in one go. Indeed, the basic pattern for a European banking law was then designed, and as far as the basic ideas concerning harmonization of banking legislation are concerned, it is still a helpful document.
In 1972 and 1973 the draft was criticized, mainly by representative European banking organizations. Particularly on the part of Great Britain, objections were raised against harmonizing banking legislation in one big operation; the fundamental ideas of the 1972 draft were left intact except as far as supervision of solvency and liquidity was concerned. Several EC partners turned out to share the British objections, as did the European Commission, which by the end of 1973 abandoned the "all-round" draft in favour of the step-by-step method. This implied that European banking law was to be created in the course of time on the basis of a series of partial directives. The first proposed directive, submitted by the European Commission to the Council, was published on January 17, 1975 Checked against recognized sound principles, the proposed directive seems an acceptable first step. All that has been said so far in the way of an objective, is that European banking legislation must provide scope for free and responsible banking within the whole Community unhampered by national frontiers. The fourteen articles drafted do no more than indicate the direction into which European banking legislation might develop, implying no actual co-ordination in the first stage. So all we can do for the moment is to check how far the draft presented conforms to sound principles, which we propose to do by confronting it with four fundamental considerations.
Scope for Banking ActlvlUes
First, then, European banking law should offer full scope for banks to carry out all basic banking operations associated with payments, loans, and financial services within the Community.
On three main points the draft seems quite acceptable as far as the first consideration is concerned.
[] The admission of a credit institution will be judged by objective criteria, viz. its own funds and its capable and reliable management. Admittedly, the question may arise whether the definition of a "credit institution" is sufficiently wide, particularly because latitude has been left for tightening it later on. Moreover, the proposal authorizes member states to apply supplementary admission criteria, though the European Parliament has turned down evaluation by "economic need" as practised in Italy and France.
[] Once admitted, credit institutions are free to undertake all banking activities; that implies that the legislature accepts the principle of universal EC banking (unlike what is common in Germany, the term does not refer specifically to participations). How far credit institutions want to specialize their activities is exclusively their own concern; obviously they are themselves the best judges of the need to do so.
[] Finally, while it is justified to create, in the course of time, a banking law that gives credit institutions freedom to establish branches everywhere in the Community, operations will always be supervised -in particular as far as the control of solvency and liquidity is concerned -from the country of origin.
Protection of Customers' Interests
Second, European banking law should -put in general terms -afford to bank customers proper protection of their interests, in particular to those who have entrusted their money to credit institutions. This basic consideration reflects the wish to continue the relationship existing at present between the banks and their customers in the Western monetary system, a relationship that emphasizes the fiduciary character of that system. On the one hand, customers trust their banks, withdrawing their deposits only to a limited degree in a given period. The banks, on the other hand, counting on their customers' trusting attitude, invariably keep less currency at hand than could theoretically be demanded by their clients. They can afford to do so provided they manage their liquidity and solvency in such a way that there is no reason for more withdrawals than is motivated by transactions and normal precaution.
It is the banks that carry the primary responsibility for such an understanding, and for that reason they must provide for a sound composition of their balance sheets; legislation and supervision only be complementary and reinforcing. Under normal circumstances, monetary authorities will never assume responsibility for the state of affairs in banking. And rightly so! We may in this context recall the objective admission criteria mentioned above, and anticipate the discussion on proper supervision of liquidity and solvency which is to follow. Deposit insurance, already included in the 1972 draft and later again referred to by the European Commission, may be added later as a measure for the protection of clients' interests.
Liquidity and Solvency Supervision
Third, European banking law should make provisions for the effective supervision of the liquidity and solvency of credit institutions. It seems desirable briefly to examine the implications of this supervision, especially with reference to the division of responsibility indicated above. Supervision, which will always have to be based on ratios, runs through three phases. In the first, numerator and denominator are defined; in the second, the size is determined, and in the third, compliance is checked.
It may be instructive to know how such a threephase programme is implemented in the Netherlands. There, the numerator is constituted by the liquidity assets a credit institution needs to hold in order to meet obligations on demand. The denominator consists of the deposits made, for they represent the amounts that can be demanded. The ratio of the two is designed to express as well as possible what "being liquid" means. Next, the size of numerator and denominator is determined in such a way as to account accurately for differences in withdrawability. The result is a highly differentiated set of ratios, which seems to work reasonably well as an instrument of liquidity supervision. At any rate, in Dutch banking no serious liquidity problems have been experienced in the whole of the post-war period, nor are they likely to occur in the near future. However, that is no proof that this kind of supervision can indeed pass muster.
Supervision of solvency, like that of liquidity, has until now largely aimed at maintaining a formally correct state of affairs. Here, the description of "own funds" in the numerator of the ratio should be a matter of primary concern. In respect of bank solvency funds can only qualify as "own" if they are at the unconditional, immediate, and permanent disposal of the credit institution. The denominator contains risk-bearing liabilities, especially credits. The motive is that own funds must cover the risks incurred in operations. If the ratio has been properly set and is complied with, the value of deposits remains untouched; the credit institution is then formally solvent. Serious efforts have been made to set up a system of solvency supervision on that basis, because it would neatly distinguish between the various risks inherent in different assets. The result of these efforts was, again, a differentiated set of ratios. It is not encouraging to check the development of bank solvency against the ratios recommended, and one wonders whether the starting points were properly chosen.
A bank will never succeed in being completely liquid in a formal sense, because in our monetary system there will always be more demand deposits than liquid funds. As already pointed out, that is inherent to the fiduciary monetary system. Consequently, the ~iquidity ratio is invariably hypothetical; it merely indicates that, within the limits of probable withdrawals, the credit constitution
